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Public policy, disaster risk management and climate change 
adaptation 
 
Abstract 
Public policymakers are caught in a dilemma: there is a growing list of urgent issues to 
address, at the same time that public expenditure is being cut. Adding to this dilemma 
is a system of government designed in the 19
th
 century and competing theories of 
policymaking dating back to the 1950s. The interlinked problems of disaster risk 
management and climate change adaptation are cases in point. As the climate changes, 
there will be more frequent, intense and/or prolonged disasters such as floods and 
bushfires. Clearly a well integrated whole of government response is needed, but how 
might this be achieved? Further, how could academic research contribute to resolving 
this dilemma in a way that would produce something of theoretical interest as well as 
practical outcomes for policymakers? These are the questions addressed by our 
research via a comparative analysis of the 2009 Victorian bushfires, the 2011 Perth 
Hills bushfires, and the 2011 Brisbane floods. Our findings suggest that there is a need 
to: improve community engagement and communication; refocus attention on 
resilience; improve interagency communication and collaboration; and, develop 
institutional arrangements that support continual improvement and policy learning. 
These findings have implications for all areas of public policy theory and practice.  
 
Introduction  
Over the last decade a series of major droughts, bushfires, cyclones, storms and floods have 
placed both disaster risk management and climate change adaptation firmly on the public 
policy agenda. As the climate changes further, it is predicted that the number of these 
weather-related disasters will increase in intensity, duration, and/or frequency (IPCC 2012). 
What is therefore needed is an integrated response across all levels of government that makes 
the best use of scarce public resources. The problem is how to achieve this integration in an 
environment where: (1) public expenditure is being reduced; and, (2) there are strong and 
growing claims from other policy areas that compete for scarce public resources (particularly 
with regards to healthcare, education, and welfare). In a nutshell, the research problem boils 
down to a common dilemma: is it possible to find a more coherent way for governments to do 
more with less?  
 
This paper addresses this problem using the findings of a research project entitled: The Right 
Tool for the Job: Achieving climate change adaptation outcomes through improved disaster 
management policies, planning and risk management strategies. This project aimed to 
develop the foundations for an integrated approach to disaster risk management and climate 
change adaptation. The research was undertaken by a team from Griffith University and 
RMIT University over one year (2012) that was funded by the National Climate Change 
Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF). The research centred on a comparative case study 
of the 2009 Victorian bushfires, the 2011 Perth Hills bushfires, and the 2011 Brisbane floods. 
The first stage of the project was a literature review that provided the relevant overview of 
disaster risk management arrangements and climate change adaptation policies in Australia. 
Stage two was an analysis of the official inquiry reports into each of the three case study 
disasters to identify common themes. Next, a series of semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with 22 key stakeholders in Perth, Melbourne and Brisbane, to examine these 
themes in more detail and develop proposals for change. Finally, three workshops were held 
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(one in each city) with a broader range of 26 practitioners and stakeholders drawn from both 
the public and community sectors to review the proposals and identify any gaps. 
 
1) The nature of the problem 
The best available science indicates that the climate is changing and there will be significant 
environmental, economic and social impacts as a consequence. The environmental impacts 
include rising temperatures, increases in sea levels, greater coastal erosion, changing 
precipitation patterns, reductions in ice and snow cover, loss of habitat, accelerated species 
extinction, and an increase in the frequency, duration and/or intensity of weather-related 
events such as cyclones, storms, floods, heatwaves, droughts and bushfires. The economic 
impacts will include the loss of agricultural production, increased damage to built assets, 
higher insurance costs, greater defensive infrastructure costs, and more resources spent on 
emergency responses. Finally, the social impacts will include higher mortality and injury 
rates, damage to homes, the loss of livelihoods, a decrease in fresh water availability, an 
increase in food scarcity, a rise in the number of displaced people, and an increased risk of 
conflict (IPCC 2007, 2012; Royal Society 2010; AAS 2010; NOAA 2011; Stern 2005).  
 
Australia is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change because of its geography, 
economy and settlement patterns. Although it is difficult to accurately predict local impacts, 
the long term trend is for the majority of the temperate south to get drier and the tropical 
north to get wetter. For the south this means a significant reduction in crop production, more 
pressure on water supplies, and the increased risk of bushfires. For the tropics, it means 
increased risks from storms and cyclones. As most of the major population centres in 
Australia are located on the coast, they will face a higher risk of inundation and coastal 
erosion. Further, the likelihood of more frequent, extreme and prolonged heatwaves will 
increase the rate of mortality, particularly amongst the elderly and the ill (IPCC 2007b, 2012; 
CSIRO 2010; Garnaut 2011). 
 
Some examples of what is to come might be drawn from recent history. The 2011 
Queensland floods demonstrated what happens when there is a deluge in catchment areas that 
feed into major cities and towns, while the 2009 Victorian bushfires and 2011 Perth Hills 
bushfires revealed the increased fire risk from prolonged dry periods. It should be noted, 
however, that climate scientists are reluctant to attribute specific events such as these to 
climate change. Floods, droughts and bushfires have always been a part of the Australian 
environment, but these kinds of events are likely to increase because of climate change (IPCC 
2012; QFCI 2012 & 2011; GWA 2011; VBRC 2010). The argument put forward here is 
simply that because climate change is linked to disaster risk management through these 
weather-related events, an integrated and improved response to both is needed. 
 
The complex and far reaching nature of climate change has led many to label it a ‘wicked’ 
policy problem (APSC 2007; Head 2008; Rittel & Weber1973) and some have even gone so 
far as to call it ‘diabolical’ (Garnaut 2008). The concept of wicked problems was developed 
by Rittel and Weber (1973) who gave them ten attributes: 
1. They are difficult to define;  
2. There is no end or boundary to the problem;  
3. There is no agreed criteria to judge the correctness of a response;  
4. Responses have unforeseen consequences; 
5. Responses that go wrong cannot be easily undone; 
6. It is not possible to identify all response options; 
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7. There is no suitable precedent to guide decision makers; 
8. There is a strong interconnection with other problems; 
9. There is no agreed explanation of the cause or the seriousness of the problem; and, 
10. Mistakes in either action or inaction are very costly. 
While climate change clearly exhibits these attributes, it is interesting to ask whether the 
move to classify them as ‘wicked’ might also be an indictment of the limitations of existing 
systems of government.  
 
Because climate change has significant public policy implications from the international 
through to the national, state and local levels of government, it cannot be handled by a single 
agency or portfolio (Howes & Dedekorkut-Howes 2012; Ross & Dovers 2008). Further, the 
link between climate change and extreme weather-related disasters requires an integrated 
response. The prevailing institutional structures and policymaking processes, however, may 
create significant barriers in developing an effective, efficient and appropriate response 
(Althaus, Bridgman & Davis 2007; Howes 2005; Toyne 1994; Beck 1992). 
 
2) The institutional context 
Beck (1992) pointed out that the main institutions of modern government were created in the 
nineteenth century and were not designed to address current complex environmental issues. 
The oldest environmental agencies only date back to the early 1970s, and climate change 
organisations did not emerge until the late 1980s (Howes 2005).  
 
The Australian system of government is a case in point. It was shaped by a constitution 
drafted in the 1890s by a group of independent colonies that were reluctant to cede power to a 
new national government. The result was a compromise that blended institutions from the 
USA and UK into what is sometimes referred to as the ‘Washminster mutation’ (named after 
the governments of Washington and Westminster) (Jaensch 1997; Thompson 1980). Local 
Governments were not mentioned in the constitution and exist entirely at the mercy of State 
Governments that were formed from the pre-existing colonies (Howes & Dedekorkut-Howes 
2012). Climate change and disaster risk management were simply not on the political agenda 
when these institutions were created, so there is no mention of them in the constitution.  
 
The underlying dynamic of the Australian political system is an on-going vertical power 
struggle between the three tiers of government. This has been particularly fierce when it 
comes to complex issues related to the environment that cut across local, state and national 
boundaries (Ross & Dovers 2008; Howes 2005; Toyne 1994). There have, however, been 
some moves to improve collaboration between levels through the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) and a range of joint councils (Howes & Dedekorkut-Howes 2012).  
 
In addition to these vertical power struggles, there have been corresponding horizontal 
rivalries between different organisations within each level. Governments have traditionally 
divided up their responsibilities into discrete areas, such as emergency services, the 
environment, public health, housing, infrastructure, business, agriculture, etc. This strict 
demarcation has led to a ‘silo mentality’ within organisations that encourages a narrow view 
of issues within their purview and tends to overlook the broader or cross-agency implications. 
Furthermore, there is the risk of ‘turf wars’ as responsibilities and resources are jealously 
guarded and other organisations are seen as competitors (Liebrecht & Howes 2006). These 
kinds of rivalries are exacerbated by issues that necessarily cut across the defined areas of 
responsibility such as climate change and disaster risk management (Productivity 
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Commission 2012; APSC 2007). A flood or a bushfire, for example, will have implications 
not only for the emergency services that need to provide the immediate response, but will 
also require the intervention of other government organisations to provide health care, 
housing, financial assistance, and repairs to infrastructure. In recent years there have been 
moves to improve cooperation and coordination in Queensland, for example, at the regional 
level, with joint bodies being established between various agencies and local government to 
coordinate the delivery of services (Rolfe, et al. 2009; Howes 2006). This was extended by 
the creation of the Queensland Reconstruction Authority after the 2011 Queensland floods. 
 
3) Policymaking processes 
While the governing institutions at the heart of the Australian political system set the stage, 
the policymaking processes within them direct the behaviour of the actors. These processes 
have a strong formal component that is embodied in public sector rules and procedures but 
there is some debate as to how they might best be described. Perhaps the most popular view 
is that of the ‘policy cycle’ which characterises policymaking as a series of logical steps: 
issue identification; policy analysis; policy instruments; consultation; coordination; decision; 
implementation; and, evaluation. At the end of the evaluation step, any issues that are 
revealed or remain unresolved start the next turn of the cycle (Althaus, Bridgman & Davis 
2007). Critics of this view argue that policymaking is not as logical or clear cut and point out 
that even the proponents of this model have admitted that it is more of an ideal than a 
definitive explanation of practice (Colebatch 2005). The idea of a logical step by step process 
remains influential in many policies, plans and decision-making routines. The prevailing 
model of prevent, prepare, respond and recover (PPRR) in disaster risk management is a good 
example.  
 
Notwithstanding the attraction of the policy cycle, one of the ongoing debates is whether the 
process should proceed via giant leaps (the rational comprehensive school) or small steps 
(incrementalism). The rational comprehensive approach conceives policymaking as rational, 
balanced, objective and analytical process in which decisions are made in a series of stages 
starting with identification of the problem or issue and ending with the implementation of a 
solution. The approach advocated by this model implies that all possible options are 
considered in detail and that one alternative is chosen over others entirely on merit, thus 
effectively discounting the influence of political and other external factors (Productivity 
Commission 2012). Critics of the rational comprehensive approach consider it to be based on 
an unrealistic ideal, noting that such comprehensiveness is rarely possible in practice, 
sufficient information is often not available, and ‘solving’ policy problems may be a fantasy; 
in practice, problems are redefined, insufficiently addressed or re-emerge (Handmer & 
Dovers 2007; Sutton 1999). There have also been criticisms of the step-wise approach and of 
the assumption that policy formulation and implementation can be separated (Heazle 2010; 
Bell 2002; Neiman & Stambough 1998; Sutton 1999). What if a problem is not easy to 
define? What if there are clashing goals and objectives? What if policymakers are not aware 
of all the options available? What if the costs and benefits cannot easily or accurately be 
calculated? What if policymakers and planners are influenced by factors such as ideas, 
economic interests, political ideology, discourses or values and so fail to optimise the cost-
benefit ratio?  
 
Incrementalism, the main competitor to the rational comprehensive model, was proposed in 
the 1950s by researchers such as Charles Lindblom who acknowledged that policymakers 
have to deal with imperfect or incomplete information about issues and options (Lindblom 
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1979). He believed that democratic systems tend to resist radical change and that a strategy of 
incremental change through small steps could allow policy makers to address parts of larger 
problems using familiar tools and drawing on their past experience. Critics of this theory 
argue that such an approach makes substantial improvements to society impossible, but 
Lindblom suggested that over time these steps could build into significant changes. While 
this view of policymaking is perhaps more realistic than the rational comprehensive model, it 
is less than optimal and does not provide a strategic way forward because it only considers a 
small number of alternatives for dealing with a problem and tends to choose options that 
differ only marginally from existing policies (Handmer & Dovers 2007). For each alternative 
only the most important consequences are considered. There is no optimal policy decision as 
the focus is on small changes. It relies on constant improvement and review to identify and 
address policy problems.  
 
Attempts to avoid the pitfalls of both the rational comprehensive and incremental models 
have given rise to hybrid approaches that propose an iterative or sequential approach to 
policy development and implementation (Dror 1964). This approach has the capacity to adopt 
an institutional learning cycle that draws on the on-the-ground knowledge of key stakeholders 
to drive policy changes. Indeed it has been suggested that responding to problems like 
climate change require such a sequential or iterative decision-making approach because it 
allows “decisions to be made and revised repeatedly over time in response to new knowledge, 
accumulated experience, or changed conditions” (Parson & Karwat 2011:744). This might 
include new scientific knowledge about climate change and associated impacts, changes in 
technologies, or changes in goals and priorities. 
 
Although complex interlinked issues like climate change and disaster risk management 
appear at face value to be well suited to rational comprehensive policymaking the uncertainty 
inherent in the knowledge of local risks and the clash of values renders this model 
unworkable in practice (Heazle 2010). On the other hand, the issues and challenges are so 
pressing that their resolution requires more rapid and substantial changes than an incremental 
approach can deliver. Perhaps, therefore, the best hope lies in the adoption of a sequential, 
iterative approach – something that might even be characterised as Bayesian policymaking. 
Questions remain, however, on how such an approach might cope with uncertainty, the clash 
of values, and whether it can deliver the needed changes in time.   
 
4) Current climate change adaptation policies 
The preceding sections have elucidated three elements of the policy problem. First, climate 
change has profound policy implications for Australia, particularly with regards to adaptation 
and has been characterised as a ‘wicked’ problem. Second, although an integrated response is 
needed to both climate change and disaster risk management, the Australian institutional 
context discourages collaboration across and within levels of government. Third, there 
remains considerable disagreement about whether the policymaking process can generate the 
scale and speed of change required. All three elements have manifest themselves in current 
responses to climate change adaptation.  
 
The National Climate Change Adaptation Framework (COAG 2007) is the touchstone for 
coordinating climate policy across the three levels of government in Australia. It was 
developed by COAG in 2007 to improve understanding of the problem, build adaptive 
capacity and reduce vulnerability. This led to the creation of the National Climate Change 
Research Facility and identified priority areas of action in: water resources; coastal regions; 
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biodiversity; agriculture, fisheries and forestry; human health; tourism; settlements, 
infrastructure and planning; and, natural disaster management.  
 
In 2009 the Australian Department of Climate Change (DCC) released Climate Change Risks 
to Australia’s Coasts: A first pass national assessment (DCC 2009) that provided all levels of 
government with some indication of the key risks to coastal settlements. This was followed in 
2010 by the Commonwealth’s Adapting to Climate Change in Australia: An Australian 
Government Position Paper (DCC 2010) acknowledging that responsibility for adaptation is 
shared by all levels of government, business and the community. While the Commonwealth 
saw itself as playing a leading role in some areas, it was made clear that most of the heavy 
lifting would have to be done by the other levels of governments.  
 
In 2011 the Productivity Commission investigated the barriers to climate change adaptation at 
the request of the Commonwealth government. This resulted in the release of an Issues Paper 
(Productivity Commission 2011) followed by a Draft Report (Productivity Commission 
2012), both of which saw climate change as a market failure and stressed the need for market 
solutions. In 2011 the Commonwealth created the Climate Commission to inform the public 
debate about climate change through a series of reports.  
 
At the state level, climate change adaptation policies and plans are in a state of flux. In 
October 2012, for example, the Western Australian government released a new policy 
statement entitled Adapting to Our Changing Climate (GWA 2012) that showed how rainfall 
in the south-west of the state had declined since 1950 and discussed bushfire prevention, 
early warning, control and defence. The Victorian Government is required by its Climate 
Change Act 2010 to develop a Climate Change Adaptation Plan every four years and the first 
one was due at the end of 2012. While Queensland developed some climate change policies 
that dealt with adaptation under the Bligh government, (including ClimateQ: Toward a 
Greener Queensland and the Draft South East Queensland Climate Change Management 
Plan) these policies were never fully implemented and the election of the Newman 
government in 2012 shifted the policy focus away from climate change (Norman 2012). 
 
At the local government level, the DCC ran a Local Adaptation Pathways Program in 2008 
that provided grants to local councils for developing their own adaptation plans (the list of 
participating councils included several from Western Australia, Victoria and Queensland). In 
addition, eighty seven local councils in Australia are members of the network of International 
Councils for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) Local Governments for Sustainability 
that has several voluntary programs on climate change adaptation (ICLEI 2012). As with 
state governments, policies and plans at the local level are in a state of flux (Norman 2012). 
The Gold Coast City Council, for example, had developed a Climate Change Strategy that 
included adaptation in 2009 but by late 2012 it was considering making cuts to its climate 
change department (Killoran 2012). 
 
5) Current disaster risk management arrangements 
Australia has an array of legislation, organisations, financial instruments, and coordination 
mechanisms designed to manage disasters that include multi-tiered institutional arrangements 
and formal coordination forums (World Bank & QRA 2011:11). In general these 
arrangements, along with a high coping capacity (primarily a function of income, savings and 
insurance), ensure that although disaster events may cause extensive damage, mortality rates 
are generally low and communities are able to recover relatively quickly (O'Brien, O'Keefe, 
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Rose & Wisner 2006:66). The challenge is how the system will cope in future as climate 
change increases the frequency and or intensity of disasters caused by extreme weather 
events (IPCC 2012; Productivity Commission 2012).  
 
There have been considerable efforts to improve collaboration between agencies and develop 
a more consistent national response amongst the different levels of government. COAG has 
again played a key role supported by the joint ministerial Standing Committee on Police and 
Emergency Management and the National Emergency Management Committee (that is made 
up of the Directors-General of the relevant departments) and its sub-committees (comprising 
officers from the key agencies). 
 
The Commonwealth, through the Attorney-General’s Department and Emergency 
Management Australia, seeks to facilitate a national approach to disaster risk management by 
maintaining a constructive dialogue between the states and territories on issues of national 
importance (EMA 2000; Pitman 2006). This has encouraged the adoption of an all hazards, 
all agencies, and prepared community approach to disaster risk management as well as the 
standard PPRR policymaking model. Two key policies used by all governments are the 
Australian Emergency Management Handbook and Manuals and the National Emergency 
Risk Assessment Guidelines (NERAG). Funding can be sourced from the National Disaster 
Resilience Program and the National Disaster Response and Recovery Arrangements. 
 
In Queensland there is the Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (2010), the Disaster 
Management Act 2003 and Public Safety Preservation Act 1986. Coordination is handled by 
the State Disaster Management Group (comprised of state departmental Directors-General) 
with three subgroups dealing with disaster coordination, recovery and mitigation respectively. 
In the aftermath of the severe flooding in 2010-11 and cyclone Yasi in February 2011, the 
Queensland Reconstruction Authority was established to coordinate and implement recovery 
efforts. In Western Australia, the Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA) is the lead 
agency and operates under the Western Australian Emergency Management Policy. In the 
aftermath of the Perth Hills bushfires, FESA is being restructured into a department. Victoria 
has its own Emergency Management Act 1986 and Emergency Management Manual 
Victoria. The lead agency was the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner but in 
December of 2012 it was announced that a new coordinating body, Emergency Management 
Victoria, would be created (Government of Victoria 2012). 
 
At the local level, councils have an important role to play in disaster planning and response 
but many have limited capacity to deal with major disasters without the support of state 
agencies. The Queensland government has District Disaster Management Groups and Local 
Disaster Management Groups to coordinate efforts at the local and sub-regional level. Similar 
arrangements operate in Western Australia. Relationships between the state and local 
governments in Victoria are currently being reviewed. 
 
6) Case studies: the findings of the official inquries 
Despite these developments, question remains about how well this array of policies, 
processes and institutions will cope with the impacts of climate change, particularly with 
regards to the increasing demands on disaster risk management. Three recent natural disasters 
offer some useful insights: the 2009 Victorian bushfires; the 2011 Perth Hills bushfires; and, 
the 2011 Brisbane floods. A comparative analysis of the official inquires into these disasters 
has been matched against more general research in the area to produce four proposals. First, 
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there is a need to improve community engagement and communication. Second, there is a 
need to refocus attention on resilience. Third, there is a need to improve interagency 
communication and collaboration. Finally, there is a need to develop institutional 
arrangements that support continual improvement and policy learning. These proposals 
should help to address the problems discussed in the previous sections of this paper. Further, 
they may provide key points for developing an integrated response to disaster risk 
management and climate change adaptation. 
 
In terms of community engagement and communication, responding to issues such as disaster 
risk management and climate change adaptation requires a whole of government approach 
that necessarily relies on a willingness to work across agency boundaries and with the 
community and business at the local level (Productivity Commission 2012; APSC 2007). 
Goode, et al. (2011) note that there is scope for improvement in community engagement 
particularly with respect to clearly communicating risks and hazards. Our own analysis of the 
2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC) bore this finding out with the 
Commission’s report making repeated references to the need for better community 
engagement and communication appearing in its reports (VBRC 2010c: 3, 31, 34, 37, 230, 
352). Similarly, the report into the 2011 Perth Hills bushfires extended these concepts to 
include the notion of shared responsibility for disaster risk management across sectors (GWA 
2011: 13, 46). The need for improvements to community engagement and community also 
featured prominently in the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (QFCI) final report 
with regard to improving community preparedness and assisting local groups with disaster 
risk management (QFCI 2012: 118, 122). In short, a sound communication and engagement 
strategy is needed to enable well-informed communities to participate in their own adaptation 
and risk management. 
 
With regard to refocussing on resilience, traditionally disaster risk management has followed 
the PPRR policymaking model. Although this approach has been very useful for emergency 
management organisations to plan their work, it has been suggested that PPRR creates 
artificial barriers between the elements of risk management and a more proactive approach 
may be better suited to the challenges at hand (Handmer, et al. 2011; Rogers 2011). 
Introducing the goal of building community resilience as a central component of PPRR might 
allow for a more integrated and pro-active approach. One of the problems identified in all 
three disaster inquiries was the lack of consensus on the definition of resilience (VBRC 
2010:31, 34, 230; GWA 2011: 13, 46; QFCI 2011: 115, 118, 122). The task is therefore to 
adopt a “holistic approach” which generates a “common understanding that is robust enough 
to operate in different policy contexts” (Prosser & Peter 2010:10-11). If both disaster risk 
management and climate change adaptation policies can develop this common understanding, 
then opportunities for policy integration and enhancing community resilience to the threats of 
climate change and natural disasters should become apparent and be more easily pursued. 
 
On the point of improving interagency communication and collaboration, there is a growing 
awareness that top-down, hierarchical, command-and-control approaches to policymaking are 
being increasingly challenged by more collaborative, flexible and networked models of 
governance (Waugh & Streib 2006). This is certainly the case in Australia where disaster risk 
management arrangements depend on interagency and intergovernmental actions as well as 
working together with volunteers, non-government organisations, businesses and the 
community. Of course there are still improvements to be made. The Victorian Bushfire Royal 
Commission found that there the “operational response was hindered by difference between 
agencies’ systems, processes and procedures” (VBRC 2010a:18) and “true integration was 
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not achieved” (VBRC 2010a: 8). Communication and coordination problems were also cited 
as problems in both the Brisbane floods and Perth Hills bushfires inquiries (QFCI 2011: 115; 
GWA 2010: 133). In their consideration of these same disaster events Goode, et al. (2011) 
noted that each agency has its own specialised knowledge in relation to specific risks and that 
there is insufficient shared understanding between these silos of knowledge. All three 
inquiries highlighted the need to clarify roles and responsibilities, to coordinate actions better, 
and for improved leadership arrangements to enhance interagency communication. Effective 
interagency communication and collaboration is essential for a delivering a coordinated all 
hazards, all agency approach as advocated by Emergency Management Australia and State 
Governments. Improved networking, cooperation, collaboration and cooperation has the 
potential to deliver a range of benefits in both a disaster management and climate change 
context relating to the building of inter-agency trust, improved information exchange, 
collaborative decision making, risk sharing and pooling limited resources to achieve common 
goals. These points also apply equally to climate change adaptation and other areas of 
environmental policy (Ross & Dovers 2008). 
 
Finally, regarding the need for institutional arrangements that support continual improvement 
and policy learning, all government organisations have to respond to rapidly changing 
economic, social and environmental contexts. As a consequence they need to redesign their 
structures and procedures to be more flexible and adaptable, and to enable continual 
improvement and policy learning. The Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (2010c: 81, 
86, 229) promoted the need for agencies to learn from their experiences and to conduct more 
research into the level and distribution of risk. The Perth Hills bushfire report recommended a 
new set of institutional reviews, education and training (GWA 2011: 188), while the Brisbane 
floods inquiry recommended improving hydrodynamic modelling and forecasting to improve 
decision making (QFCI 2011: 24, 62). Goode, et al. (2011) note that each of these inquiries 
also highlight a number of institutional issues associated with state emergency management 
arrangements. Part of the solution to these challenges requires innovative, comprehensive 
solutions that can be modified in the light of experience and on-the-ground feedback (ASPC 
2007: Waugh & Streib 2006). Successfully tackling these problems requires a broad 
acceptance and understanding, including from governments, that there are no quick fixes and 
that levels of uncertainty around the solutions need to be tolerated. In order to be effective 
disaster risk management and climate adaptation need to be integrated into mainstream 
government operations and each other. Furthermore, approaches require continuous review to 
encourage policy learning and improvement. Institutional arrangements which support this 
may include integrating climate adaptation into all phases of PPRR (Birkmann & von 
Teichman 2010). 
 
7) Findings on the implementation of change 
The four themes outlined above were explored in more detail through semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders in Western Australia, Victoria and Queensland (where the 
three case studies were located). Most of the participants were public sector workers involved 
in disaster risk management and a few were involved in climate change policymaking. Their 
positions ranged from on-the-ground officers to senior executives. The interviews confirmed 
what had emerged from the literature review and inquiry report analysis and produced some 
practical proposals for change. These interview findings were then used to guide a series of 
three workshops (one each in Perth, Melbourne and Brisbane) with a broader range of 
stakeholders that included community organisations and an expanded range of public sector 
workers from a wider variety of agencies. These workshops acted as a peer-review process to 
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test the practicality of the proposals for reform, identify issues that may have been 
overlooked, and generate new insights and proposals. 
 
7.1) Community engagement: Local community resilience grants 
Two key points that emerged from this research are: (1) the key role that local governments 
have to play in both climate change adaptation and disaster risk management; and, (2) the 
need for a sense of shared responsibility where the community and business take action to 
improve their own resilience. One way to address both these points could be through the 
development of a local community resilience grants scheme. The idea is that each council 
would set aside a small amount of their budget, (perhaps only a couple of hundred thousand 
dollars would be necessary) and advertise for the community to come up with proposals for 
simple projects that could improve local resilience to disasters (such as floods and fires) and 
climate change. (One project, for example, might be to establish a network of volunteers who 
would take responsibility for ensuring that a particular group of vulnerable elderly people got 
to safety during an emergency). Selecting and prioritising successful projects could then be 
done via a popular vote by residents at a town or ward meeting. The advantage of this 
proposal would be to encourage concrete improvements in resilience, raise community 
awareness about their vulnerability, and create a sense of ownership of, and support for, 
proposals for change. 
 
This proposal was discussed at the workshops and generally endorsed. There were some 
concerns, however, about whether the broader community was convinced of the need to take 
action on climate change. Further, the question of whether there was a suitable level of 
awareness of the vulnerability to disasters such as floods and bushfires was also raised. 
Finally, there was the view that some sections of the community might feel that this kind of 
action could be left to the government. These concerns suggest that there would need to be an 
accompanying public education and community engagement program, focussing on climate 
change adaptation and disaster risk management. 
 
Many local governments already offer community grants programs. Some grants are used to 
fund local volunteer groups (such as surf life saving) while others fund small nature 
conservation projects and community centres. Implementation of this proposal could simply 
involve a combination of any or all of the following changes: the creation a new category of 
grants; redirecting some of the existing money into projects which are specifically focussed 
on building local resilience; recognising the impact that existing programs have on increasing 
resilience; modifying existing programs to enhance their contribution to community 
resilience; and, changing decision making mechanisms to allow for a popular vote. 
 
7.2) Focus on resilience: a shared policy vision 
Although the use of the concept resilience has become increasingly prevalent in the 
emergency management sector in Australian in recent years (Handmer, et al. 2011) the 
inquiry reports demonstrate a lack of consensus on the definition of resilience in the disaster 
setting (VBRC 2010:31, 34, 230; GWA 2011:13, 46; QFCI 2011:115, 118, 122). The finding 
is supported by the work of Goode, et al. (2011:20). This consistent with other policy 
domains, including climate adaptation, in which there is there is no clarity or shared vision 
around “what resilience means, beyond the simple assumption that it is good to be resilient” 
(Davoudi 2012:299). Our participants agreed that while  
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“there's about 45 definitions of resilience... in general terms you're wanting a 
community that…isn't totally flattened or permanently destroyed…[and has] some 
sort of capability and capacity to rebuild and keep going” (Victorian government 
official 8). 
 
However, in terms of developing a shared vision, all agencies need to agree on ‘the big 
picture’ and focus on their ‘higher order purpose’. This would require some agreement on 
common goals, such as improving community safety and resilience. There would also need to 
be some recognition of the complementary role of each agency in contributing to the 
achievement of these common goals and a commitment to this shared vision by the relevant 
executive officers and Ministers to implement a consistent set of cross-government standards. 
This would include developing a shared understanding of the full range of relative risks and 
vulnerabilities for a given community so that agreed actions can be prioritised. Both climate 
change and disaster risk management, as well as their inherent uncertainties, would need to 
be integrated into this strategic thinking. 
 
“It’s not about one hazard. It can’t be one hazard. It can’t be one. Climate change is 
not going to be just about fire or whatever. It’s got to be then - everyone’s got to focus 
on emergency management. It’s no longer just the fire service or the flood agency to 
think of it. It’s an all government, local government responsibility. Whether it be [the] 
education department, transport department or primary industry, everyone should 
have an understanding of what it means to them. So it’s across every part of 
government. And all of their partners. If Red Cross is a partner to DHS? They’ve got 
to understand their role, and what they do and how they do it.” (Victorian 
government official 4) 
 
Certainly, there are already a range of international and national strategic documents which 
seek to provide a framework for addressing disaster response arrangements and climate 
change. It should be noted, however, that there have been attempts to develop a shared vision 
for these kinds of cross-cutting and strategic issues on a national scale in the past. The Hawke 
government developed the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development in 
1992 after two years of extensive consultation between all levels of government, business and 
the community. Subsequently, the Howard government’s Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 required all Commonwealth departments and agencies to 
report to parliament annually on their contribution to sustainability (Howes 2005). The Rudd 
government revisited the concept as part of the Australia 2020 Summit in 2008 that again 
brought all sectors of society together to agree on a shared set of goals. Despite these efforts 
Australia remains a long way from sustainability and this example demonstrates the need for 
well coordinated policy and institutional changes to support and implement the shared vision 
(Howes 2008; Ross & Dovers 2008). So developing a shared vision is an important first step, 
but the reforms must go further to ensure the consistent and effective achievement of that 
vision. 
 
7.3) Inter-agency collaboration: cooperative funding 
Traditionally all three levels of government have funded specific departments or agencies and 
their associated programs. This may encourage competition for funds between agencies and 
levels of government and discourage collaboration. What if part of the pool of public funding 
was set aside and attached to resolving particular problems? What if agencies were 
encouraged to form consortiums across all levels of government as well as with the private 
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and community sectors in order to bid for these funds? This could create a tangible financial 
incentive that encourages multi-level, inter-agency collaboration, as well as cross-sector 
partnerships (hence sharing the responsibility with business and the community). Some of the 
issues to which the funding could be attached could include finding ways to build resilience 
to a range of natural disasters (such as floods and bushfires) and climate change. 
 
This proposal was raised for discussion at all three workshops and generally got a favourable 
response. There were some concerns, however, about the amount of time that would be taken 
up in applying for funding and undertaking project reporting, and the uncertainty around 
whether a project may get approval. Other concerns included: the need to ensure that the 
approach gave adequate consideration to local and contextual issues; that it was seen as a 
complement to existing programs; and, that it did not prevent agencies from delivering their 
‘core services’.  
 
In terms of practicality, there are already precedents for this approach to funding. Landcare 
grants have been operating for over two decades, allowing local community groups, 
government agencies, and businesses to bid for funding to rehabilitate various local 
environments. More recently, the National Climate Change Adaptation Facility (which funds 
our project) offers grants to research specific problems that are bid for by consortiums of 
different universities, research organisations and government agencies. Although all levels of 
government are currently attempting to rein in spending, this proposal could simply be an 
expansion of the existing Natural Disaster Resilience Program grants scheme that is run 
under partnership agreements between the State and Commonwealth governments. Further, 
there are funds in the Caring for Our Country program (that includes Landcare) and 
Infrastructure Australia (that encourages public-private partnerships). Finally, COAG is 
currently reviewing its funding of National Partnership Agreements, so this may be an 
opportune time to try this proposal. 
 
7.4) Institutional learning: embedded researchers 
The need for the emergency management workforce to understand the implications of climate 
change for disaster risk management emerged as a recurring theme throughout this project. It 
was a need recognised by a broad cross-section of senior executives, officers on the ground, 
volunteers, and community groups. The problem is that climate science is complex and there 
are a lot of uncertainties in trying to delineate impacts at the local level. One proposal that we 
put forwards was to embed climate researchers within emergency management organisations 
so that they can and work with staff on developing a shared understanding of the risks as well 
as redirect their research into areas of shared priority. This would be a two-way exchange and 
the researchers would also learn about the process of disaster risk management. Ideally they 
would have regular contact with front-line troops to improve their understanding of the 
shifting risk profile, as well as senior levels of management to help them see the big picture 
and recognise their shared objectives with other agencies. 
 
This idea was discussed at the workshops and received some qualified support. There were 
some concerns about how these researchers could be funded, who they would answer to, their 
ability to remain independent, and whether there would be some sensitivity if their research 
outputs might be construed as critical of the host organisation. 
 
There are a several options for addressing these concerns. Some large agencies already have a 
research department, so adding a climate expert would fit easily into existing structures. 
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Other agencies might not have this capacity but could potentially engage in ongoing 
partnerships with organisations that have the required expertise. Finally, there is the option of 
forming a consortium to research and learn about a specific threat. This might draw on 
existing funding such as the Australian Research Council Linkage Grant scheme or perhaps 
the kind of funds provided by proposal one on collaborative funding.  
 
7.5) Other organisational changes 
A number of different organisational change strategies were promoted during this project that 
could be knitted together to form a coherent package for improvement. Starting at the top, 
COAG will need to play a key role in ensuring all levels of government are working towards 
an integrated approach to disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. It has 
already made a move towards a nationally consistent approach in both these areas (e.g. with 
the National Climate Change Adaptation Framework and the National Emergency Risk 
Assessment Guidelines) supported by the relevant Ministerial and departmental committees 
(see section 4). What is needed now is to reorganise existing committees and agreements into 
a more coherent whole. This also needs to be done at the state level of government in order to 
generate a consistent executive commitment to improving resilience.  
 
The next change would be to create new, and revamp existing, interagency senior officers 
groups to translate the executive commitment into day-to-day management changes within 
their respective agencies. Finally, a network of ‘champions’ should be created across all 
agencies that involves staff who will look for ways to implement adaptation measures and 
provide points of inter-agency collaboration. These champions could be selected on the basis 
of their interpersonal skills, enthusiasm, and willingness to develop long-term working 
relationships with staff in other agencies. They would also form working partnerships with 
business and community organisations. 
 
These ideas emerged from the interviews and participants in the workshops. Several 
participants talked about examples of where some of these changes had happened on a small 
scale but they emphasised the need for both a top down commitment, and a bottom up 
enthusiasm, for change. A recurring theme was the need to build social capital within and 
between organisations. The point was also made that staff need clear guidelines to decide 
when to collaborate and when to go it alone, as collective action requires a considerable 
investment of time and resources. 
 
Conclusions 
Climate changed has been labelled as a ‘wicked’ policy problem because it is difficult to 
define, has complicated consequences and requires a whole of government response. One of 
its impacts is to increase the frequency, duration and/or intensity of disasters such as floods 
and bushfires. What is therefore needed is an integrated policy response to both climate 
change adaptation and disaster risk management.  
 
This project has addressed this problem using a comparative case study of the 2009 Victorian 
bushfires, the 2011 Perth Hills bushfires, and the 2011 Brisbane floods. It started with a 
literature review and analysis of the inquiry reports into these events then moved on to 
interviews and workshops with the relevant key stakeholders. Four key proposals emerged to 
improve: community engagement and communication; a renewed focus on resilience; 
interagency communication and collaboration; and, institutional improvement and learning. 
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These themes are starting points for improving disaster risk management and integrating it 
with climate change adaptation. 
 
Proposals for practical changes were developed and reviewed that address the proposed 
reforms. First, local community resilience grants could raise public awareness about local 
vulnerabilities and lead to some practical improvements in resilience. Second, developing a 
shared policy vision of resilience as a goal would act as a useful compass to guide decision 
making at all levels. Third, providing cooperative funding for the resolution of specific issues 
would encourage agencies at all levels to work in partnership with each other, business and 
the community. Fourth, embedding climate researchers in disaster risk management agencies 
would help these organisations to learn about the implications of climate change for their 
work and help them develop a shared goal of improving resilience. Finally, several simple 
organisational changes would improve networking across all sectors.  
 
All of these changes could be achieved within existing funding constraints and would enable 
the public sector to integrate disaster risk management with climate adaptation policies at all 
levels. Hence governments can find a more coherent way to do more with less.  
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